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Detecting Collusion in Oligopolistic
Industries: A Comparison and Proposal
By JOSEPH F. ZELLMER
Member of the Class of 1983
I. INTRODUCTION
The term "oligopoly" refers to a type of industry structure where a
small number of firms control a large percentage of a market.' This
type of industry structure is prominent in American business.2 There
has been much debate among antitrust law scholars3 concerning how a
firm in an oligopoly sets its price and whether, under various economic
analyses, such price is a competitive prie.4* Many feel that while this
debate continues, United States law allows oligopolists to avoid detec-
tion and punishment for collusive pricing activities.'
This Note will describe two major theories of oligopoly pricing. It
will explain that "tacit collusion,"6 a type of agreement which may be
1. This is meant to give the reader a general idea of the type of industry to which the
term relates. For a definition of an oligopoly see infra text accompanying note 10.
2. Industries commonly classified as oligopolies include the passenger car, steel, ciga-
rette, and gasoline industries. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ANTITRUST 333
(1977). For statistics which demonstrate the high degree of concentration in American in-
dustry, see Scherer, Concentration in Tarticular Markets, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND ANn-
TRUST LAW 113 (T. Calvani & J. Siegfried ed. 1979); see also C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER,
ANTITRUST POLICY 275-91 (1959).
3. Compare P. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 39-78 (1976) with Turner, The Definition of
Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Paralldism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARv. L
REv. 655 (1962); see L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 331-55 and 3 P. AREADA & D. TURNER,
ANTITRUST LAW 359-90 (1978).
4. "With various postulates as to what oligopolistic sellers will assume, economists
have advanced oligopoly theories predicting results ranging from purely competitive to
purely monopolistic pricing and output." 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, stpra note 3, at 273;
L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 331; see INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION AND THE MARKET
SYSTEM (E. Fox & J. Halverson ed. 1979) and F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUC-
TURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 131-57 (1970). For a description of a market in which
there is perfect competition see 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 3, at 268.
5. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 355; C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 2, at 110;
R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 39.
6. R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 42.
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entered into by oligopolists without direct communication, has re-
mained outside the reach of United States cartel law.
The Note will compare the present American approach to proving
collusion in oligopolistic industries to two alternative approaches-one
proposed by Richard A. Posner' and one presently utilized by the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice for the European Economic Community.8
Both of these approaches stress the significant evidentiary value which
can be given to economic data regarding industry structure and
performance.
In conclusion, the Note will propose that United States courts
adopt an approach similar to that of the European Economic Commu-
nity. If economic evidence indicates a lack of competition in an oligo-
polistic market, further evidence that firms in the industry used
"facilitation mechanisms," 9 such as advance announcements of price
changes, should be held sufficient to allow an inference that defendant
oligopolists have entered an illegal agreement to dispense with price
competition.
II. THE ECONOMICS OF OLIGOPOLY PRICE-FIXING
A. A Definition of Oligopoly
An industry is oligopolistic when so large a share of its total output is
in the hands of so few relatively large firms that a change in the out-
put of anyone of these firms will discemably affect the market
price .... [S]o long as there are two or more large firms, each of
which is conscious of its individual power to affect price, oligopoly
prevails.) °
In order to illustrate, first assume an industry in which 100 compa-
nies sell equal amounts of Widgets in only one market. If one firm
reduces its price and increases its output by ten percent, the other
ninety-nine sellers will equally share a loss of only one percent of in-
dustry sales. The market price for Widgets will not be discernably af-
fected because individual firms' sales are barely affected by the pricing
7. See infra notes 88-98 and accompanying text. Richard A. Posner is presently a
judge in the Seventh Circuit of the Federal Court of Appeals. His ideas concerning oligopo-
lies are expressed in Posner, Oilgopoly and the Antitrust Laws. A SuggestedApproach, 21
STAN. L. REV. 1562 (1969); R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 39-95; and R. POSNER & F. EASTER-
BROOK, ANTITRusT 306-46 (2d ed. 1981).
8. See infra notes 120-140 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 149-154 and accompanying text.
10. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 331. For a similar definition see 2 P. AR-EDA & D.
TURNER, supra note 3, at 272.
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and output moves of a single competitor. The pricing decision of the
company in an atomistic industry is based primarily on its own costs
and conception of the demand curve for its product.
This is in contrast to the result in an oligopolistic industry where
there are only three sellers of Widgets. Each firm will be more sensitive
to the pricing and output changes by the other firms. If one firm (the
"price cutter") reduces price and increases output, it will "steal" a sale
from one of its two competitors with each extra unit of output. The
competitors must choose between lowering their prices or surrendering
part of their market shares to the price cutter. Furthermore, if one firm
reduces output to raise prices, the other two could benefit from the re-
duced supply by raising their prices at their same or increased level or
output. Each firm in an oligopoly, therefore, has the power to affect the
market price."
B. Economic Analyses of Oligopoly
1. The Interdependence Theory
Antitrust law scholars have debated for many years about the pric-
ing process of oligopolists. A major theory focuses on the interdepen-
dence of firms in an oligopoly.' 2 It is proposed, in essence, that an
oligopolistic industry structure forces each firm to depend on the other
firms in the industry to avoid price competition which could erode the
profits of all. 3 The theory posits that the firms cooperate, without
communication, to set and keep prices at a level satisfactory for all
firms. Proponents of this theory argue that the oligopolistic structure
allows and necessitates cooperation and sets prices at supra-competitive
levels.1 4
For example, assume again the three seller Widget industry. As
demonstrated above, if firm A lowers price and increases output it will
steal the customers of firms B and C. If B and C, however, quickly
respond to match A's lower price, the market shares will return to the
status quo. Firm A will have wasted resources in expanding capacity
11. This illustration is synthesized from L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 337-43 and R.
POSNER, supra note 3, at 39-43.
12. The interdependence theory and a proposed application of the antitrust laws is ar-
ticulated in Turner, supra note 3, at 655-73. This theory provides the basis for the claim that
oligopolistic industries act as "shared monopolies." See 3 P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, supra
note 3, at 359-90; see infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text. For a concise explanation of
the theory, see L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 337-43.
13. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 338.
14. Id at 341; see supra note 12.
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and all three firms will realize less profits than before A lowered its
price. Having made these predictions of behavior, the interdependence
.theorists posit that if firms in an oligopoly were to engage in price com-
petition they would quickly compete themselves out of profits and
business.
This, according to the theory, does not mean that the price of a
good sold by an oligopolist can never change. There is not the same
impediment to raising prices as to lowering them. It is urged that firms
in an oligopoly will tend to follow the price increases of a price
leader.'5 Suppose firm A raises its price. Firms B and C could con-
tinue to charge their lower price in the hope that A's customers would
defect to them. Firm A, however, would not let that happen and would
simply lower its price back to its competitors' level. On the other hand,
firms B and C could instead respond to A's price increase by raising
their prices. All three firms would then realize more profits while
maintaining their respective market shares. According to interdepen-
dence theorists, firms in an oligopoly need not communicate to act to-
gether in implementing such an industry-wide price increase. Using
this method to establish prices, the firms are said to engage in mere
"conscious parallelism"'16 of behavior which is both allowed and neces-
sitated by the interdependence of firms in oligopolistic markets.
Proponents of the interdependence theory claim that the existence
of oligopolistic industries has severe negative effects in the marketplace.
The primary effect is said to be an absence of price competition.'7 It is
argued that firms in oligopolies do not make price changes when sup-
ply and demand fluctuate or when industry-wide cost reductions occur
because there is no incentive for them to lower their prices.'" When
this lack of price competition is combined with the demonstrated ten-
dency toward the practice of price leadership, it is argued that oligo-
polists use their interdependence to reap monopoly profits.t 9
The theorists also posit that firms in an oligopoly tend to operate
15. Under the theory firms need not actually communicate to fix prices but the price
leadership practice can be seen as affording firms the opportunity to "speak" to each other
through price moves. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 340.
16. Much debate has focused on the merits of the interdependence theory and on the
legality of consciously parallel behavior by oligopolists. See Note, Conscious Parallelism-
Fact or Fancy?, 3 STAN. L. REV. 679 (1951); Turner, supra note 3; Posner, supra note 7. See
also L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 331-55.
17. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 337-38.
18. Id at 343.
19. Id at 338. "Monopoly signifies the power to increase price above the competitive




at below maximum efficiency.20 This may occur because each firm's
output is always restricted to the amount which can be sold at the in-
dustry price. Furthermore, smaller inefficient firms can enter the in-
dustry and profit by undercutting the large firms yet charging above the
price which would be charged under conditions of perfect competi-
tion.21 Finally, it is urged that firms are forced to resort to non-price
competition 2 which might be harmful to buyers. This type of competi-
tion is said to be manifested in massive advertising campaigns, super-
fluous style changes, exorbitant packaging, and extensive service
attendant to the product. 3
Under the interdependence theory, these negative effects are seen
as inherent in any industry with an oligopolistic structure. While the
logic of this theory might seem sound, economic study to date is incon-
clusive?' on the degree to which business behavior can be predicted
with certainty from market structure.
2. Inadequacies in the Interdependence Theory
In explaining the process which purportedly results in supra-com-
petitive pricing by oligopolists, the interdependence theorist "depends
on a number of critical, but unexamined, factual assumptions."" The
theory assumes a model industry in which two or three sellers serve the
same geographic market, sell a standardized product, have identical
costs, have full knowledge of market demand at various prices, and
20. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 343; 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 3, at 279.
21. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 335; 2 P. AREEDA & D. TuaNE, supra note 3, at 279.
Competition would be seen as "perfect" in an industry where:
(1) Sellers and buyers are so numerous that no individual's output or
purchasing decision has any perceptible impact on price.
(2) Each seller and buyer makes his decisions independently, without agree-
ment with or influence from others.
(3) All productive resources are freely mobile among markets;, there are no
barriers to entry or exit.
(4) All sellers and buyers have complete knowledge of all production tech-
niques, input costs, prices, and other relevant market facts.
(5) Producers make input-output decisions solely to maximize return on cap-
ital, that is, they seek minimum-cost production techniques and net-revenue maxi-
mizing levels of output.
(6) There are no "externalities": producers pay all social costs incurred in
the production of goods and services, and receive payment for all social benefits
conferred.
2 P. AREEDA & D. TuRNM, su.pra note 3, at 268.
22. 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 3, at 369-70.
23. Id; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 336-37, 343.
24. See supra note 4.
25. R. PosNan, supra note 3, at 44.
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have immediate knowledge of price changes by other firms.2 6 The
major flaw in the interdependence theory is that it fails to demonstrate
that any existing industry is structured like the model 27 and fails to
explain its application when variations on that model are observed. In
the great majority of industries, including those commonly character-
ized as oligopolistic, there are significant variations from this model
which complicate a pricing decision beyond mere consideration of the
prices of other firms.28
For instance, the severe consequences which are claimed to flow
from oligopolistic interdependence would be diminished in any indus-
try where a product is not exactly standardized. 29 Also, if the costs of
any firm in an oligopolistic industry are less than those of the others,
that firm might cut its prices and maintain a profit margin while divert-
ing customers from its competitors. 0 Thus, in some instances there
might be a tendency for oligopolists to lower price. Furthermore, the
price elasticity of demand for goods sold by oligopolists can vary
greatly between products.3 1 This factor, relevant to all pricing deci-
26. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 3, at 274; see L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at
337-43; Turner, supra note 3, at 663-64.
27. This is not meant to assert conclusively that such a model industry does not exist,
but interdependence theorists have yet to point to an industry in which their hypothesis can
be proven. See Posner, supra note 7, at 1574-75. Furthermore, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC) reviewed 300 industries before prosecuting breakfast cereal producers under a
"shared monopoly" theory. The FTC was unable to prove the theory. Wall St. J., Sept. 11,
1981, at 7, col. 1; see infra note 53 and accompanying text.
[Interdependence theory] really says very little more than that if a few sellers who
occupy most of a market were able to act in concert, without collusion, they would
be able to achieve results in rate of output and prices very much like those a mo-
nopolist could achieve under the same cost and demand conditions. That state-
ment is less a theory than a tautology. It says only that tf sellers can behave that
way, they can behave that way. But the theory itself does not tell us whether they
can or do...
R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 179 (1978) (emphasis
in original).
28. R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 44-47; R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 7, at
333-35. "Monopoly pricing by oligopolists is made more difficult, and hence less likely, by
any factors that cause the profit-maximizing price for the firms to differ, tempt one or more
to behave competitively, or create uncertainty as to rivals' responses." 2 P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, supra note 3, at 274.
29. Posner, supra note 7, at 1573-74; 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 3, at 274,
The European Economic Community's Court of Justice found this factor important in re-
jecting a defense based on the interdependence theory. See infra note 124 and accompany-
ing text.
30. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 3, at 274. This factor was also emphasized
by the European Court of Justice in the Dyestuffs Case. See infra notes 110 & 124 and
accompanying text.
31. R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 44. Price elasticity of demand refers to a measure of a
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sions, is crucial to the determination that monopoly profits are not
available for most goods.
The interdependence theory also does not adequately explain how
oligopolists achieve and maintain a supra-competitive price when there
is a time lag between one firm's price adjustment and competitors' reac-
tions.32 If there is such a time lag, a price cutter could realize substan-
tial profits before its competitors could respond. Conversely, each firm
would be hesitant to exercise price-leadership if each knew others could
profit at its expense by not reacting or reacting slowly to match its
higher price.33
In light of the unwarranted assumptions upon which the interde-
pendence theory is based, there is presently no basis for assuming that
price competition is lacking in an oligopoly34 and that supra-competi-
tive prices result unavoidably from the industry structure. The firm in
an oligopoly sets its price after consideration of many factors other
than its competitors' prices. The pricing decision is independent, differ-
ing from that in an atomistic industry only because the oligopolist
places relatively more emphasis35 on anticipated competitor price
reactions.
This Note takes the position that oligopolists do engage in price
competition and, therefore, as is the case with firms in atomistic indus-
tries, they must collude in order to fix prices and reap monopoly profits.
In order to prove illegal collusion between oligopolists, however, spe-
cial consideration must be given to the effect of the industry structure.
customer's willingness to purchase goods at different prices. Demand is considered inelastic
if buyers will purchase the same quantity of a good regardless of price. Demand is elastic if
each buyer will spend its money elsewhere if the price of a good is even a cent higher. It is
very difficult to measure this factor accurately. Id Depending on this elasticity, new buyers
would enter the marketplace to buy from an oligopolist who cut price. This would diminish
the impact of the price cut on other firms in the industry. Id at 45.
32. Id at 46.
33. Id
34. Accord L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 344 (calling for more study of oligopoly pric-
ing and warning against "extreme responses").
35. Accord Turner, supra note 3, at 665-66. Posner and Turner agree on this point, but
their views diverge on whether noncompetitive effects occur without collusion in an oligop-
oly. Turner argues that industry structure, not culpable conduct, causes parallel behavior to
be rational and uses this point as an argument against enforcing section 1 of the Sherman
Act against conscious parallelism in oligopolies. Id at 663-66. Turner, however, has advo-
cated the use of section 2 of the Sherman Act to divest firms in oligopolies. Turner, "he
Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 HARV. L REy. 1207, 1231
(1969). See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
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3. Tacit Collusion
Firms in oligopolistic industries usually sell to the same market
and, thus might decide to act in concert to dispense with price competi-
tion. They might choose to enter a cartel to fix prices. Such a cartel
would be relatively simple and inexpensive to form and maintain be-
cause few firms need be involved.3 6 Because firms in an oligopolistic
industry are often large, they might have sufficient resources to cover
up the cartel and avoid antitrust detection. 7
In the alternative, oligopolists can reach an even less costly and
less risky agreement to restrain trade without developing a common
plan and without direct communication between them. Richard A.
Posner, an antitrust scholar and a judge in the Seventh Circuit of the
Federal Court of Appeals, has termed this type of agreement "tacit
collusion. 38
This type of agreement can be illustrated as follows. Suppose that
firm A raises its price and firms B and C similarly raise their prices. On
these facts alone, there is mere parallelism of behavior and no basis for
a finding of antitrust culpability. The result should be different, how-
ever, if A is extending an invitation by raising its price, and B and C
knowingly follow the invitation by raising their prices. An agreement
is formed which is similar to a unilateral contract. In that instance
firms A, B, and C are doing more than acting alike because each has
agreed to charge a fixed price and to dispense with price competition.39
This tacit collusion could be a widespread practice in oligopolistic
industries.40 Major problems arise, however, in attempting to detect
36. Hays & Kelley, An Empirical Survey of Price-Fixing Conspiracies, in ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST LAW 144 (T. Calvani & J. Siegfried ed. 1979); R. POSNER, stpra
note 3, at 47; Posner, supra note 7, at 1570.
Posner urges that any decision whether to collude will be based on a cost-bcnefit analy-
sis. The potential profits must be measured against the costs of cartel formation, coordina-
tion, enforcement, and avoidance of detection. R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 47-52; Posner,
supra note 7, at 1570-73. "The problems of arriving at a mutually agreeable price and then
maintaining it in the face of temptations to cheat exist whether few or many sellers are trying
to collude. The only difference is that these problems are more easily overcome. . . " R.
POSNER, supra note 3, at 54; see Asch & Seneca, Is Collusion Profitable?, in ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST LAW 148 (T. Calvani & J. Siegfried ed. 1979).
37. Posner, supra note 7, at 1575; accord L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 339. "Some
degree of concentration thus appears to be a necessary condition of successful collusion in
markets governed by the Sherman Act." R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 52. See infra notes 92-
94 and accompanying text.
38. R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 42.
39. Id at 71-72; Posner, supra note 7, at 1576.
40. "Posner is really offering a way to strike at the pricing restraint said to be character-
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and prove such an informal, yet economically destructive, cartel.4 '
When parallel behavior is observed, it becomes the courts' duty to de-
termine whether such parallelism was the result of a tacit agreement.
United States courts have been ineffective in their attempt to detect and
prove this type of price-fixing agreement.42
I1. THE UNITED STATES' ANTITRUST LAWS
AGAINST COLLUSION
A. The Basic Antitrust Statutes
The antitrust statutes of concern in this Note are set forth in the
Sherman Act of 18901 and the Federal Trade Commission Act of
1914.4 Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes illegal "[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce. .. . Section 246 is a broad prohibition
against monopoly and attempts to monopolize. Section 5 of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act prohibits "[u]nfair methods of competition
in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce."'47 The primary purpose of these statutes has been
declared to be the furtherance of fair competition which is necessarj in
a free enterprise economy.48
This antitrust legislation has, of course, achieved its goal to a de-
gree. There are no longer huge trusts dominating sectors of American
industry through the elimination of all competition as was the case
before Senator Sherman's bill.49 The law, however, did not respond to
regulate competition adequately in the oligopolistic industries which
istic of oligopolists, and. . . there is good reason to doubt that such restraint exists in the
absence of explicit and detectable agreement." R. BoniK, supra note 27, at 175.
41. See infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 72-87 and accompanying text.
43. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
44. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1982).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
46. Section 2 states that it is illegal to "monopolize or attempt to monopolize, or com-
bine or conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize. . . ' 15 U.S.C. § 2
(1982).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982).
48. See, ag., United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). "Antitrust
laws in general and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise.
They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise sys-
tem as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms." Id
49. For a brief history of the development of the perceived necessity for antitrust laws
in the United States see E. GELLHORN, ANTrnRusT LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NuTsTIELL I-
18 (2d ed. 1981).
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developed.50
Several proposals have urged the use of section 2 of the Sherman
Act or section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to divest firms in
oligopolies because they allegedly cooperate to act like a single firm
monopoly. Former Harvard professor Donald F. Turner has unsuc-
cessfully urged that industry restructuring is necessary because oligo-
polists act rationally in setting prices via conscious parallelism and,
therefore, an injunction or a fine could not deter these practices.5" Tur-
ner supported a bill entitled the Industrial Reorganization Act, 52 which
proposed the deconcentration of oligopolistic industries. The bill was
introduced to Congress in 1972 and has apparently died. In another
attack on oligopolistic industry structure, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion advanced a theory of "shared monopoly"53 and sought divestiture
of the oligopolistic ready-to-eat breakfast cereals industry under sec-
tion 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. This action was recently
dismissed by an FTC administrative judge after ten years of case
preparation.54
These various efforts have been correctly rejected. The interde-
50. When the [Sherman] Act was passed, its wording was adequate to deal with the
obvious monopolies and overt conspiracies then existing. The Act, however, has
been rendered somewhat obsolete by the ingenuity of those firms adept at avoiding
a violation of the law while achieving the desired end of lessening competition.
Note, Conscious Parallelism and the Sherman Act: An Analsis andA Proposal, 30 VAND. L.
REV. 1227, 1247 (1977); accord L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 355.
Present Clayton Act rules governing horizontal mergers are designed to "prevent the
emergence of new or the aggravation of existing oligopolies." Posner, supra note 7, at 1598.
The primary justification behind these rules is to avoid interdependent pricing. .d A prob-
lem in this approach might lie in a failure to consider economies of scale-i.e., that larger
merged firms might be more efficient. See R. BORK, supra note 27, at 7, 405.
51. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
52. S. 3832, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 118 CONG. REC. 24925 (1972) reintroduced as S. 1167,
93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reintroduced with minor modifications as S. 1959, 94th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1975).
Hearings were held in the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly in 1973
(see 1974 C.I.S. Annual, Abstracts, at 727) and 1974 (see 1975 C.I.S. Annual, Abstracts, at
850); see Note, The Industrial Reorganization Act: An Antitrust Proposal to Restructure the
American Economy, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 635 (1973).
For summary and commentary on this and other legislative proposals see L. SULLIVAN,
supra note 2, at 367-73.
53. FTC Dkt. No. 8883; see Note, Oligopoles, Cereals and Section Five of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 61 GEO. L.J. 1145 (1973); Foreward." Shared Monopoly and the Glf/
ford Connection, 12 ANTITRUST L. & EcoN. REV. No. 4, at 1 (1980). For a thorough
description of the "shared monopoly" concept see 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 3,
at 359-90.
54. Wall St. J., Sept. 11, 1981, at 10, col. l;seesupra note 27. According to FTC Chair-
man James Miller, the case cost taxpayers $5.9 million. 98 F.T.C. 892, 894 (1981).
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pendence theory is the basis for these proposals. That theory, however,
has yet to satisfactorily prove that oligopolistic structure alone breeds a
lack of competition. This Note has attempted to demonstrate that if
anticompetitive symptoms are observable in an oligopolistic industry,
they are probably caused by conscious parellelism and not necessitated
by the structure of the industry.55 Because an agreement is probably at
the root of any lack of competition in an oligopoly, this Note proposes
the use of section 1 of the Sherman Act or the broad proscription of
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to detect and prove
oligopolistic tacit collusion.
B. Parallelism of Behavior and Evidentiary Requirements to Prove
Agreement Under American Case Law
1. Development of the Law Concerning Conscious Parrallelism
The essence of a Sherman Act, section 1 violation is an agreement
between competitors to restrain trade.56 The parties to the agreement
need not have the market power5 7 to realize monopoly profits in order
to violate the statute.5" The Supreme Court has stated "[t]he crucial
question is whether [the]. . .conduct. . . stemmed from an independ-
ent decision or from an agreement. . ... 59 Although decisions clearly
indicate that all types of agreements are illegal,60 the statute has not
been implemented to uncover the tacit collusion possible in oligopoly.6'
In recognition that direct evidence of an agreement might often be
impossible to discover,62 courts have long understood that business be-
havior can be valuable circumstantial evidence.63 Several decisions
have examined how evidence of parallel behavior, common in an
oligopolistic industry, might be relevant to proof of illegal collusion.
55. Posner, supra note 7, at 1575; see supra notes 25-35 and accompanying text.
56. Esco Corp. v. United States, 310 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1965).
57. "'Market power' is the ability to raise price by restricting output... It is substan-
tial where a firm can raise price substantially without a significant profit decline resulting
from competitors' increased output or lower prices or from consumer resistance at the higher
price." 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 3, at 322.
58. Agreements having the effect or purpose of fixing prices are illegal per se under the
rule of United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).
59. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Co., 347 U.S. 537, 541 (1954).
60. Id; see 310 F.2d at 1006-08.
61. See supra note 48.
62. "In practice, proof of the existence of a conspiracy or agreement has been very
difficult. The mere existence of the Sherman Act warns businessmen to be carefuL .. ." 2
E. KIrTNER, FEDERAL ANrrrRusT LAW 35 (1979).
63. See Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Assn. v. United States, 234 U.S. 600,612
(1914).
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In the 1939 case Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States' the
Supreme Court wrote what was then interpreted to be the key to pene-
tration of the structural barrier immunizing oligopoly from antitrust
reach. In that case a motion picture exhibitor sent letters to film dis-
tributors suggesting a minimum price the distributors should charge.
Each letter listed the competing distributors as other recipients of the
letter. All distributors followed the pricing suggestion. The court
found an illegal agreement in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act
and declared in now famous dicta: "[i]t was enough that, knowing that
concerted action was contemplated and invited, the distributors gave
their adherance to the scheme and participated in it."'65
One could interpret the Court's statement as a prohibition of con-
scious parallel action in oligopoly and, therefore, mistake conscious
parallelism as a Sherman Act offense. 6 That interpretation, however,
has been generally regarded as superseded by the subsequent clear lan-
guage of the Court in the 1954 case Theatre Enterprises, Inc. Y. Para-
mount Film Distributing Corp. 67 In that case, the owner of a suburban
theater attempted to purchase rights to show first run movies, but was
refused by all distributors. The Court refused to find collusion as a
matter of law and stated,
To be sure, business behavior is admissible circumstantial evidence
from which the fact finder may infer agreement .... But this Court
has never held that proof of parallel business behavior conclusively
establishes agreement or, phrased differently, that such behavior it-
self constitutes a Sherman Act offense. . . . "[Clonscious parallel-
ism" has not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely.68
As demonstrated above,6 9 this passage is clearly correct in not
making conscious parallelism, without more, an antitrust violation.
However, the court in Theatre Enterprises did not hold, as is commonly
believed,70 that a jury may not infer agreement from evidence of paral-
64. 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
65. Id at 226.
66. See, e.g., a case decided after the Interstate Circuit case and before the Theatre En-
terprises case where the court stated, "In practical effect, consciously parallel business prac-
tices have taken the place of the concept of meeting of the minds which some of the earlier
cases emphasized. Present concert of action, further proof of actual agreement among the
defendants is unnecessary.. . ." Milgram v. Loew's, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 416, 419 (E.D. Pa.
1950), af'd, 192 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 929 (1952).
67. 346 U.S. at 537.
68. Id at 540-41.
69. See supra notes 25-35 and accompanying text.
70. P. MARCUS, ANTITRUST LAW AND PRACTICE 201 (1980); R. POSNER & F. EASTER-
BROOK, supra note 7, at 341.
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lel behavior alone, but rather that such evidence alone was not enough
to entitle a plaintiff to a directed verdict."1
2. The Plus Factor Approach
Since the Theatre Enterprises decision, courts have required that
plaintiffs present additional evidence72 besides proof of defendants'
parallel behavior before plaintiffs can be entitled to a jury verdict infer-
ring an agreement. The further evidence demanded has been referred
to as "plus factors"73 which add to the courts' suspicion of parallel be-
havior. The Interstate Circuit74 case might have turned on the presence
of such plus factors as: 1) knowledge that concerted action in the
scheme was invited; 2) a course of conduct which was very different
from past practices); 3) actions which would have been contrary to in-
dependent self-interest if performed alone; and 4) defendants' inability
to explain the parallel course of conduct as resulting from some cause
other than conspiracy."
The court in Interstate Circuit did not indicate which of these fac-
tors had to be proved before a jury could draw an inference of agree-
ment, and the Theatre Enterprises case provided no clarification. 76 It
has been stated that evidence of parallelism is merely "circumstantial
evidence the probative value of which necessarily varies with the kind
of parallelism and the factual setting where it is found."7 7 Examples of
other plus factors which could support a finding of agreement are 1) ev-
idence that the parties had opportunities to discuss pricing or evidence
of actual communication;78 2) evidence that they exchanged price in-
formation;79 3) evidence of deliberate product standardization;80 4) evi-
71. P. MARCUS, supra note 70, at 201; L POSNER & F. EASTERIROOB rsupra note 7, at
341.
72. For a more thorough description of Interstate Circuit, Theatre Enterprises and the
cases following, see Note, supra note 50, at 1227 and 2 E. KiNTNER, supra note 62, at 35-55.
73. P. MARcus,supra note 70, at 198; J. MCCALL, SUM AND SUBSTANCE OF ANTITRUST
134 (1980).
74. 306 U.S. at 208.
75. Id at 222-25; see 2 E. KNTNER, supra note 62 at 41.
76. 346 U.S. at 537. In the Theatre Enterprises case there were insufficient plus factors
to compel an inference that the parallel behavior was the result of an agreement. 2 E. KINT-
NER, supra note 62, at 42 n.165.
77. Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 297 F.2d 199, 203
(3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962). "The lack of guidance as to the weight of
the factors has plagued the courts and has produced inconsistent results." 2 E. YKnrNlER,
supra note 62, at 42.
78. Bray v. Safeway Stores, 392 F. Supp. 851, 857 (N.D. CaL 1975).
79. Morton Salt Co. v. United States, 235 F.2d 573, 577 (10th Cir. 1956).
80. C-O Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489,493 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 892 (1952).
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dence of identical prices regardless of the point of sale;8' 5) evidence of
an active trade association;82 6) evidence of a high profit margin;83 and
7) a satisfactory demonstration of a motivation to enter an agreement.84
Though several decisions have clearly recognized that all types of
price-fixing arrangements are illegal,85 some commentators believe that
courts look for only circumstantial evidence that the defendants had
come to an explicit agreement.8 6 They seem to search for circumstantial
evidence that the parties did communicate before engaging in parallel
-behavior.17 Though it is difficult to determine whether courts recognize
that tacit collusion could be occurring in oligopolistic industries, it
seems clear that the present plus factor approach is inappropriate to
detect it.
3. Posner's Proposed Approach to Proof of Tacit Collusion
Tacit collusion can be accomplished without business behavior of
the type most courts rely on in their plus factor analysis. For instance,
firms in an oligopolistic industry could come to agreement without di-
rect communication by announcing present or future actions, either to
the public or within the industry, which serve as invitations for compet-
itors to act similarly.88 An agreement is clearly formed when the other
81. Id at 496-97.
82. Bray v. Safeway Stores, 392 F. Supp. at 856-57.
83. Estate of LeBaron v. Rohm & Haas Co., 441 F.2d 575, 578 (9th Cir. 1971).
84. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1086 (1978). For a more complete collection of cases on this subject, see AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 34-37 (18 in 3d Supp. 1975 & 3d Supp.
1980).
85. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
86. Posner argues that the law ignores supra-competitive pricing strategies which do not
generate evidence sufficient to establish a traditional criminal conspiracy. Part of the cause,
he claims, is that judges tend to be more comfortable with conspiracy doctrines than with
economic theories of pricing. R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 41; accord C. KAYSEN & D. TUR-
NER, supra note 2, at 110. See materials quoted infra note 141. "This approach leads to
exhaustive searches through documents in the search for the smoking gun. The trial be-
comes a showcase of hotel room meetings and testimony concerning the intent behind am-
biguous acts." R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 7, at 307-08.
87. For purposes of this Note it is not necessary to determine whether, under past or
present approaches, a section 1 of the Sherman Act violation may only be found upon proof
of explicit agreement. Even Posner recognizes that his proposed approach to detection of
tacit collusion involves evidentiary change rather than substantive change. R. POSNER,
supra note 3, at 75.
88. Such announcements can serve as "facilitation mechanisms" which oligopolists can
use to achieve price uniformity without explicit agreement. This Note will show that such
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firms recognize the invitation and follow.89 Because this type of agree-
ment does not generate direct evidence of conspiracy, nor any plus fac-
tor evidence sufficient to support an inference of explicit agreement as
courts now seem to require, a new approach is necessary to prove tacit
collusion.
Richard Posner has proposed a two-stage approach" which em-
phasizes the analysis of industry structure and economic performance
to prove that oligopolists are engaging in tacit collusion. Simply put,
the first stage identifies markets where collusion is probable and the
second determines whether tacit collusion is being practiced in the
identified markets. 91
In the first stage, which emphasizes the structural analysis of in-
dustries,92 Posner urges that antitrust enforcement should be concen-
trated in oligopolistic industries.93 It is in those industries that
successful collusion is most likely because few firms need to be in-
volved to set and maintain cartel policy.94 Furthermore, oligopolistic
companies are usually large firms serving the national market. These
firms, therefore, could cause great harm to the economy if allowed to
collude successfully.95
Once oligopolistic industries are identified, Posner urges that the
economic performance of these industries should be analyzed and that
certain findings can prove the existence of tacit collusion.96 He claims
facilitation mechanisms can be useful in the detection and proof of oligopolistic tacit collu-
sion. See infra notes 149-157 and accompanying text.
89. R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 71-72; Posner, supra note 7, at 1576.
90. R. POSNER, upra note 3, at 55-62; R- POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 7, at
336-38.
91. R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 55.
92. Posner lists the following factors as indicative of an industry's propensity toward
collusion: 1) market concentrated on the selling side; 2) no fringe of small sellers; 3) inelastic
demand at the competitive price; 4) prolonged entry into the industry; 5) many customers;,
6) a standardized product; 7) the principal firms selling at the same level of distribution;
8) overemphasis on price competition; 9) a high ratio of fixed to variable costs; 10) static or
declining demand; 11) sealed bidding, and 12) a poor antitrust record. R. POSNER, spra
note 3, at 55-62; R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 7, at 336-38.
93. See supra note 92. Notice that these factors, when taken together, add up to a
model industry in which the interdependence theory of oligopoly pricing might be provable.
See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text; accord Note, Price Fixing in the European
Economic Community-Litmus Testfor International Cartels, 5 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
971, 985-86 (1973).
94. See supra note 92. As an industry assumes more of these characteristics, the
probability of successful collusion increases accordingly. See supra notes 36-37 and accom-
panying text.
95. Accord L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 347.
96. "If the economic evidence warrants an inference of collusive pricing, there is neither
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that the following ten indicators show a lack of competition and justify
finding that an agreement existed: 1) fixed relative market shares over
a substantial period of time; 2) systematic price discrimination; 3) ex-
changes of price information; 4) regional price variations; 5) identical
bids; 6) sudden price, output, and capacity chafiges; 7) industry-wide
resale price maintenance; 8) declining market shares of the largest
firms; 9) price as a function of industry concentration; and 10) similar
amplitude, frequency, and direction of price changes.97 Thus, Posner
would have this economic evidence alone be sufficient to prove that
illegal collusion is being practiced in oligopolistic industries in viola-
tion of section 1 of the Sherman Act.98
At least one United States case has nearly followed Posner's pro-
posed approach. In the 1971 Federal District Court case of WallProd-
uacs Co. v. N~ational Gypsum Co. ,99 the defendant companies withdrew
buyer discounts almost simultaneously. The court took notice of those
structural characteristics of the industry which predisposed its members
of collusion."° The court, however, did not rely entirely on structural
and performance data. It also commented that some of the firms had
made announcements prior to withdrawal of the discounts.101 The
court found the evidence "compel[led] the conclusion that the defend-
ants were engaged in a tacit understanding by 'acquiescence coupled
with assistance' to fix and stabilize prices ... .
In summary, United States antitrust law is presently ineffective in
its efforts to detect oligopolistic tacit collusion. 03 With the present em-
legal nor practical justification for requiring evidence that will support the further inference
that the collusion was explicit rather than tacit." R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 71; R. POSNER
& E. EASTERBROOK, supra note 7, at 341.
97. R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 62-71; R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 7, at
339-40.
98. For a criticism of Posner's suggested economic approach see Scherer, The Pos; ertan
Harvest: Separating Wheat from Chaff (Book Review), 86 YALE L.J. 974 (1975). "1 doubt
that the power of economic analysis has advanced so far that his two stage determination
... is feasible .... It would not, I fear, be a system highly likely to yield either truth or
justice." Id at 982-83.
99. 326 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
100. Id. at 316.
101. The firms had also exchanged price information, but the court found this to be a
legal attempt to meet competition as allowed under the Robinson-Patman Act. Id at 314,
102. Id at 316. For Posner's discussion of the significance of this case see R, POSNER,
supra note 3, at 73-74.
103. In United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978), the Supreme
Court held that criminal intent must be proven by the government in prosecutions for price-
fixing and that a defendant may not, as a matter of law, be presumed to intend the conse-
quences of its actions. Id at 435. If the government were to prosecute oligopolists for tacit
collusion on the basis of economic evidence alone, it seems doubtful that a finding of crimi-
[Vol. 6
Oligopolistic Industries
phasis apparently on explicit conspiracy and the plus factor evidentiary
approach, courts of the United States have failed to recognize the po-
tential value of structural analysis and industry performance data in
detecting collusion in oligopolies.
IV. THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY'S
APPROACH TOWARD CONCERTED PRACTICES
A. The Antitrust Laws of the European Economic Community
The antitrust statutes of the European Economic Community
(EEC) are set forth in the Treaty of Rome"° and provide a skeletal
outline'05 of substantive provisions which are similar to the United
States statutes. The antitrust law of the EEC can be seen to expound
policies similar to those of the United States because it is concerned
with encouraging trade and competition within its Member States
while simultaneously encouraging international trade.10°
Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome prohibits "any agreements be-
tween enterprises, any decisions by associations of enterprises and any
concertedpractices which are likely to affect trade between the Member
States and which have as their object or result the prevention, restric-
tion or distortion of competition within the Common Market. .... 1o
This article may be seen as the functional equivalent to section 1 of the
Sherman Act. Article 86,108 which prohibits the abuse of a "dominant
market position," parallels the restrictions on monopoly of section 2 of
the Sherman Act.'09 This Note is primarily concerned with the prohi-
bition in article 85 against "concerted practices."
The Court of Justice of the European Communities has had two
opportunities to give meaning to the term "concerted practices." The
court has recognized that, "a concerted practice, by its nature, does not
nal intent could be supported. See also Note, Criminal Intent and the Sherman Act: The
Label Per Se Can't Take Gypsum Away, 32 HAsTiNGS L.J. 499 (1980).
104. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter cited as Treaty of Rome]; the EEC is also commonly referred to as
the Common Market.
105. The EEC's rules of competition are set forth in articles 85-94 of the Treaty. Id at
47-52.
106. The Community seeks "the establishment of a system ensuring that competition
shall not be distorted in the Common Market." Id Art. 3(f) at 16. For a general depiction
of the operation of these rules, see A. PARRY & S. HARDY, EEC LAw, 277-333 (1973); Burns,
Antitrust Under the Treaty of Rome, 11 INT'L LAW. 369 (1977).
107. Treaty of Rome, supra note 104, art. 85(1), at 47-48 (enphasis added).
108. Id art. 86, at 48.
109. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1980).
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contain all of the elements of an agreement. . . ."" Something differ-
ent from and amounting to less than a traditional agreement may vio-
late Common Market antitrust law."' The court's approach to the
detection and proof of a concerted practice could serve as a model for
United States' courts to identify oligopolistic tacit collusion."12
B. The Dyestuffs and Sugar Cases
1. Facts
In the 1972 case of Imperial Chemical Industries v. Commission of
tke European Communities" 3 (Dyestuffs case) ten companies were pros-
ecuted for engaging in a concerted practice to fix the price of aniline
dyes. The Commission produced evidence that all of the firms had
nearly simultaneously raised prices three times during a four year pe-
riod." 4 These increases had been preannounced by some of the firms
involved."1 5 There was further evidence that the texts of pricing in-
structions sent by several competing producers to their subsidiaries
were nearly identical but this evidence was not commented upon in the
opinion.' 16
The Court of Justice also found a concerted practice in the 1975
case of CoOperative vereniging "Suiker Unie" UA v. Commission of the
European Communities117 (Sugar case). In an extremely long and fac-
tually complicated case report, 1 8 the court found sixteen sugar produc-
110. Imperial Chem. Indus. v. Commission of the European Communities, 1972 C.J.
Comm. E. Rec. 619, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 18161 at 8027
[hereinafter cited as Dyestuffs case].
111. "[C]ontrary to conspiracy, Article 85. . . is to be understood not as a condemnation
of a traditional tort but as the modem reply of the legislator[s] to problems of economic
order." SteindorffAnnotation on the Decisions of the European Court in the Dyestuff Cases of
July 14, 1972, 9 COMMON MKT. L. Rav. 502, 509 (1972).
112. See infra notes 141-148 and accompanying text.
113. Dyestuffs case, supra note 110.
114. Id at 8003.
115. Id at 8028.
116. Id at 8019. For a more detailed description of the facts of the case, see Note, supra
note 93, at 973-75.
Under the American "plus factor" approach to proof of agreement, such evidence
would probably support an inference that defendants were in overt collusion. See supra
notes 72-84 and accompanying text.
117. Cooperative Vereniging "Suiker Unie" v. Commission of the European Communi-
ties, 1975 [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8334 [hereinafter cited as
Sugar case].
118. Essentially, the main sugar producers in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, West
Germany, and Italy attempted to separate their national markets to allow each group of
national producers sole access to its home market. The case was further complicated be-
cause competition had already been restricted by the common organization of the market for
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ing and marketing firms guilty of engaging in concerted practices to:
1) control deliveries of sugar on the Italian, Dutch, and West German
markets; 2) restrict the possibilities for agents or independent traders to
import, export, or resell sugar; and 3) eliminate competition with re-
spect to tenders for refunds for exports to non-Member States."19
2. Definition of a Concerted Practice
In the Dyestuffs opinion, the court advanced a definition of and a
procedure for proving concerted practices. The procedure was subse-
quently expanded and clarified in the Sugar case. The court examined
the oligopolistic structure of the dyestuff industry to see if it could ex-
plain the firms' actions absent collusion of any sort. t20 The defendants
in the Dyestuffs case argued that the industry structure, in which the ten
firms controlled eighty percent of the market, fully explained and justi-
fied the series of price increases.121
In its first pronouncement of the definition of a concerted practice,
the Dyestuffs court stated
The concept of a 'concerted practice' as a form of coordination be-
tween undertakings which, without having been taken to the stage
where agreement properly so called has been concluded, knowingly
substitutes for the risks of competition practical cooperation between
them which leads to conditions of competition which do not corre-
spond to the normal conditions of the market."22
The court engaged in an analysis of the dyestuffs industry to conclude
that, absent cooperation of some kind, the price increases could not
have been simultaneously affected."- 3 It found the industry differed
from a model oligopoly and specifically pointed to the following factors
which accounted for price uncertainty in the market: 1) the products
were not completely homogeneous; 2) there were enough producers to
create a risk that the price leadership of one firm would not be fol-
lowed; 3) the ten major firms had very different cost structures, making
sugar which imposed systems of national production quotas. See Wolfe & Montauk, Anti-
trust in the European Economic Community: An Analyis ofRecent Developments in the Court
of Justice, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 349, 387 (1978).
119. See Gijlstra & Murphy, Some Observations on the Sugar Cases, 14 CoNtMON MKT.
L. REv. 45, 46-47 (1977).
120. Dyestuffs case, supra note 110, at 8027-30.
121. Id at 8015-16.
122. Id at 8027.
123. "The only explanation for the general and uniform price increase on these various
markets is that the enterprises had the same intention, i.e., to improve the price level... .
id at 8030.
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it improbable that they would simultaneously decide to raise prices;
and 4) the industry was compartmentalized into five national markets
so all firms did not have the same access to each market.1 24
In the Sugar case, the court reiterated the definition of a concerted
practice stated in Dyestuffs and rejected applicants' contention that a
concerted practice required a preconceived plan aimed at removing in
advance any doubt as to the future conduct of the parties involved in
the practice. 25 The Sugar court stressed that business decisions in the
EEC must be made independently and, refuting any argument based
on the interdependence theory of oligopoly, stated,
[T]his requirement of independence does not deprive economic oper-
ators of the right to adapt themselves intelligently to the existing and
anticipated conduct of their competitors, it does however strictly pre-
clude any direct or indirect contact between such operators, the ob-
ject or effect whereof is either to influence the conduct on the market
of an actual or potential competitor or to disclose to such a competi-
tor the course of conduct which they themselves have decided to
adopt or contemplate adopting on the market. 126
3. Proving a Concerted Practice
It is difficult to ascertain from the Court of Justice decisions
whether a particular act constitutes an illegal concerted practice or is
merely evidence leading to the inference that the parties engaged in a
concerted practice.' 27 For instance, it is not clear whether the "direct
or indirect contact"'128 referred to by the Sugar court is the prohibited
activity or if following a competitor's behavior without any contact
might be illegal. In an article in the Common Market Law Review, 29
Gijlstra and Murphy posit the former, and define a concerted practice
as "a communication, which raises the expectations of others that a
certain mode of behaviour will be adopted, without it being necessary
that the other parties acknowledge the communication."'' 30
This view should be examined and contrasted to a statement made
124. Id at 8028-30; see Comment, Common Market-Antitrust, 14 HARV. INT'L L.J. 621,
623-25 (1973).
125. Sugar case, supra note 117, at 8179; see Gijlstra & Murphy, supra note 119, at 59.
126. Sugar case, supra note 117, at 8179.
127. Accord GijIstra & Murphy, supra note 119, at 59; "It is not very easy to assess cor-
rectly what the Court's definition of concerted practices is, because the judgments combine
its definition with questions of evidence." Steindorff, supra note 111, at 509.
128. Sugar case, supra note 117, at 8179; see supra text accompanying note 126.
129. Gijistra & Murphy, supra note 119.
130. Id at 59; see Wolfe & Montauk, supra note 118, at 388.
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by the court in the Dyestuffs case rejecting the proposition that con-
scious parallelism alone should be an antitrust offense. The court
stated,
Although a parallelism of behavior cannot itself be identified with a
concerted practice, it is nevertheless liable to constitute a decisive in-
dication of such a practice when it leads to conditions of competition
which do not correspond to the normal conditions of the market,
having regard to the nature of the products, the importance and
number of the enterprises and the volume of the said market. Such is
the case especially where the parallel behavior is such as to permit
the parties to seek price equilibrium at a level different than would
have resulted from competition.1 3'
This passage can be interpreted to mean that evidence of industry
performance alone, without evidence to support an inference that the
parties had any contact or other indications of rivals' behavior, can
support a finding of a concerted practice when parallel behavior is ob-
served.'32 It is simply not clear, however, whether the industry per-
formance or the communication was the basis for the court's holding in
the Dyestuffs case.' 33
The court in the Dyestuffs case placed more emphasis on the eco-
nomic evidence than it did in the Sugar case which may be explained
by the nature of the practices involved. In the Sugar case the facts and
the economics were much more complicated, and the objectives'31 of
the defendants were different. Thus, a different type of concerted prac-
tice 3- was involved. This made it necessary for the court to focus more
on the contacts 3 6 between the firms before attributing a collusive qual-
ity to their parallel behavior.
In contrast, the Dyestuffs court seemed to rely almost exclusively
131. Dyestuffs case, supra note 110, at 8027.
132. "mhe Dyestuffs decision indicates that the [European Court of Justice], to support
a finding of concerted practices, may be satisfied with evidence simply demonstrating that
the price behavior of firms in the market is uniform where the economic structure of the
industry fails to justify such uniformity." Note, supra note 93, at 973; see Note, UnIfora
Pricing in Concentrated Markets: Is Conscious Parallelism Prohibited by 4rticle 85(1) of the
Treaty of.Rome?, 7 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 113 (1974).
133. For example, the court in the Dyestuffs case stated "[t]hrough these advance an-
nouncements, the various enterprises eliminated any uncertainty as to their future con-
duct. . . ." Dyestuffs case, supra note 110, at 8029. See supra note 127 and accompanying
text.
134. See supra notes 118-119 and accompanying text.
135. The European Court of Justice seems to view concerted practices as a residual cate-
gory for any behavior which eliminates competition and is not covered under the other
prohibitions of the Treaty. See supra note Il1.
136. Sugarcase,supra note 117, at 8179; see supra notes 125-130 and accompanying text.
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on the economic evidence, and placed little emphasis on the price in-
crease announcements made by the firms. The court did not even men-
tion the letters of similar language which had been sent from the parent
corporations to their subsidiaries137-evidence which would clearly
support a finding of overt agreement. Although the Court of Justice
has taken severe criticism 38 of its effort at economic analysis, the court
ably discerned that there were factors distinguishing the industry from
the model oligopoly' 39 and that the price increases could not have been
the result of coincidentally similar rational business behavior. 140
The Dyestuffs case might represent an attempt by the Court of Jus-
tice to demonstrate the extent to which it is willing to go to uncover
collusive activities previously thought immune from antitrust attack.
The case was based on fairly simple facts from which the economic
evidence alone clearly warranted an inference of collusion. By choos-
ing to gloss over the evidence of explicit agreement, the court was able
to introduce and define the antitrust concept of concerted practices.
The Sugar case posed a much greater challenge to the court in its appli-
cation of the concept. The facts did not clearly warrant an inference of
collusion solely from economic analysis. Thus, a heavier reliance on
the contacts between the parties was necessary.
By its language and through its reliance on economic evidence, the
court in the Dyestuffs case was probably trying to ensure that subse-
quent cases would not turn on whether evidence of communication or
other contact between firms could be found to transform parallel be-
havior into a concerted practice. It would seem, however, that in most
cases, the court, as it did in the Sugar case, will probably require that
some other evidence besides market behavior be introduced.
V. A COMPARISON AND PROPOSAL
A. Plus Factors, Posner, and Concerted Practices
The European Economic Community's concept of concerted prac-
tices may be viewed as a useful lead for American courts to follow in
an effort to effectively deal with anticompetitive pricing in oligopo-
lies. 14 1 Most importantly, the concept seems to be flexible enough to
137. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
138. See Mann, The Dyestuffs Case in the Court of Justice of the European Communities,
22 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 35 (1973); Comment, Concerted Practices, 36 MOD. L. Rrv. 220
(1973).
139. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
141. It should be evident that the EEC's concerted practices concept may go further than
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permit a finding of tacit collusion although no prearranged plan nor
direct communication may have been required for the firms to
cooperate.
In its formulation of concerted practices, the European Court of
Justice has recognized the evidentiary value of industry structure and
that such evidence may allow a fact finder to find collusion from other-
wise ambiguous and seemingly independent acts. American courts
have not placed such emphasis on structural data1 42 and have allowed
oligopolists to remain beyond antitrust law while the courts search for
evidence of explicit agreement 43 and demand plus factor evidence1
44
which oligopolists might not generate.
The Common Market approach seems similar to Richard Posner's
proposed economic approach to proving oligopolistic tacit collusion.
As discussed above, 45 however, it is not clear whether the Common
Market cases suggest placing the sole emphasis on industry structure
and behavior as Posner urges.
The primary problem with Posner's proposed emphasis is that in-
dustry structure and performance evidence is often ambiguous and ba-
sic questions about the behavior of the marketplace are unresolved.,'46
Because this data often proves inconclusive, antitrust guilt should be
predicated on structure and performance evidence only when it is very
clear as in the EEC Dyestuffs case.147 Further, the law must be explicit
so that potential antitrust defendants can know whether contemplated
acts are legal or the product of collusion.'48
present United States law to reach oligopolistic tacit collusion, especially if one takes the
view that United States courts search only for evidence of explicit agreement. "Thus prose-
cutions [in the EEC] involving conscious parallelism... will normally be based on con-
certed practices, which need not have all the elements of an agreement, while those in the
United States will be based on a conspiracy theory for which proof of an agreement is more
critical" Recent Decisions, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 375,377 (1973). "This goes beyond the United
States case law which does require a meeting of the minds, not merely a coordinated pol-
icy.. . . This judgment may go very much further than.., the United States cases on
conspiracy." Comment, supra note 138, at 222, 225.
More authority on the meaning of concerted practices may be forthcoming because the
national courts of the Common Market countries could soon begin interpreting the Treaty of
Rome competition provisions. See Kon, Article 85, Fara, 3: A Case for Application by Na-
tional Courts, 19 COMMON MKT. L. Rv. 541 (1982).
142. One exception was the court in Wall Products Co. v. National Gypsum Co. See
supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 72-84 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 127-40 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 98; 3 P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, supra note 3, at 366.
147. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
148. This concern was articulated by the Supreme Court in United States v. United
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B. A Proposal
As the Common Market approach indicates, and as Richard Pos-
ner urges, emphasis must be placed on structural and performance evi-
dence in order to effectively detect and prove oligopolistic tacit
collusion. To avoid an unwarranted finding of illegal cooperation,
however, some further evidence must be required. Because tacit collu-
sion might not generate the kinds of plus factors which American
courts now tend to seek, only a different type of evidence might be
available. This evidence can consist of proof that the firms utilized "fa-
cilitation mechanisms." 149
A facilitation mechanism is "a practice often developed over time
(and perhaps also serving some legitimate business purpose) which fa-
cilitates interdependent or cooperative behavior."15  Such practices
can be used in an oligopoly to preserve price uniformity.' 5' They do
not consist of any direct communication between firms but rather of
announcements and distributions of information through the public to
members of the industry.' Such information may enlighten competi-
tors of a firm's present or future conduct and result in "the orchestra-
tion of an industry's price and production behavior .... ,53
Examples of facilitation mechanisms which firms in an oligopolis-
tic industry might use to avoid price competition include: 1) advance
announcements of price changes; 2) the adoption of identical prices
through public dissemination of price lists (this could be accompanied
by assurances that list prices are being adhered to or the imposition of
penalties for charging less than the list price); 3) adoption of product
States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978): "[S]alutary and procompetitive conduct lying close
to the borderline of impermissible conduct might be shunned by businessmen who chose to
be excessively cautious in the face of uncertainty regarding possible exposure to criminal
punishment for even a good-faith error of judgment." 1d at 441; "[Olne can imagine situa-
tions in which it would be genuinely difficult even for the businessman himself to say
whether he was acting from individual prudence or under the suasion of a common under-
standing." A. NEALE & D. GOYDER, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES Or
AMERICA 51-52 (1980).
149. P. MARCUS, supra note 70, at 314-15.
150. Remarks by Ky. P. Ewing, Jr., Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen'l, Antitrust Div., Antitrust
Making Competition Work for Consumers, Before the 63rd Annual Int'l Purchasing Conf,
of the Nat'l Ass'n of Purchasing Mgmt., Inc., New York, N.Y., May 16, 1978, in P. MARCUS,
supra note 70, at 314 n.52.
151. Id at 314.
152. Id at 314-15; accord 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 3, at 276.
153. Remarks by William E. Swope, Director of Operations, Antitrust Division, 1978
Southwestern Corporation Law Institute, Point Clear, Alabama, April 22, 1978, in P. MAR-
cUs, supra note 70, at 314 n.52.
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standards; 4) adoption of identical formulas for determining freight
charges; 5) adoption of identical formulas to determine credit terms or
other sales terms; 6) dissemination of average cost data; and 7) utiliza-
tion of identical formulas for determining price.'5 4
In seeking to remedy collusion in oligopoly, United States courts
should follow the two-stage economic approach proposed by Richard
Posner.155 If the structural and performance evidence establishes a lack
of competition in an oligopolistic industry, further evidence that mem-
bers of the industry used any facilitation mechanisms should allow an
inference that they were in agreement to restrain trade. 5 6 This sug-
gested approach seems consonant with the Common Market's prohibi-
tion of "direct or indirect contact. . . the object or effect whereof is
. . . to influence the conduct on the market of an actual or potential
competitor. . . ."
C. Toward a Better Solution
A question arises as to whether courts have the ability and capac-
ity to perform the extensive structural and performance analysis which
the suggested approach calls for.'58 Congress or the Department of
Justice could aid the courts in their administration of the antitrust laws
by establishing guidelines to give business an indication of the bounda-
ries of those laws.
Congress or the Department of Justice should conduct studies to
identify the industries where the greatest economic harm would result
if successful collusion were practiced. In those industries, which this
Note has shown to be industries with oligopolistic characteristics, com-
munications between firms and the use of facilitating mechanisms
should be closely examined and regulated. Further, the Department of
Justice should place more emphasis on the use of the advance clearance
154. See id; Remarks of Alfred F. Daugherty, Jr., Director, Bureau of Competition,
Federal Trade Commission, Price Signalling, Before the Financial Analysis Federation,
Wash., D.C., June 19, 1979, in P. MARCUS, supra note 70, at 315 n.58.
155. See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
156. Further, the problems which could arise under Posner's proposal regarding proof of
criminal intent would not be as serious. If, along with evidence of poor industry perform-
ance, additional evidence showing use of facilitating mechanisms is presented, an inference
of intent could be justified more easily. See supra note 103.
157. Sugar case, supra note 117, at 8179; see supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 86.
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procedure' 5 9 through which business can get prior approval of contem-
plated actions which may violate rules against tacit collusion. 60
Much more study of the economics of oligopoly will be necessary
before a fully effective policy can be developed.' 6' This Note has rec-
ommended an approach which may be taken now to start closing the
gap in antitrust law where oligopolists now reside.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note has shown that a significant gap exists in United States
antitrust enforcement which creates a haven for oligopolists to exploit
through collusive pricing activities. The Note criticized the position
that oligopolistic interdependence is inherent-in the industry structure
and causes supra-competitive prices. An attempt was made to show
that independent conduct, not industry structure, is at the heart of the
oligopolist's pricing strategies. It was urged that each firm in an oligop-
oly must make a conscious choice if it desires to collude with other
firms to fix prices and seek monopoly profits.
Present United States law is ineffective against jointly acting oligo-
polists because courts have not recognized that evidence of market
structure and industry performance can be valuable to prove that infor-
mal tacit collusion, which generates no evidence of explicit agreement,
is being practiced in oligopolies. The approach of the European Eco-
nomic Community's Court of Justice shows a calculated, restrained ap-
proach to filling the oligopoly gap which could be followed
immediately by American courts.
This Note has urged that courts should be willing to analyze the
structure and performance of oligopolistic industries. If the economic
evidence indicates a lack of competition in an industry, further evi-
dence of the use of price facilitation mechanisms should justify draw-
ing an inference of illegal collusion.
It is urged that Congress and the Department of Justice assist
courts in the extensive economic analyses necessitated by the proposed
approach and seek to clearly define practices forbidden to oligopolists.
The longstanding lack of price competition regulation in concentrated
159. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1972), as amended by 38 Fed. Reg. 34804 (1973) and 42 Fed.
Reg. 11831 (1977); ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 84, at 232. In the EEC, a
firm may apply to take an action which will be allowed if it is shown that, inter alia, compe-
tition will not be materially distorted. Treaty of Rome, supra note 104, art. 85(3), at 48.
160. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
161. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 347.
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industries should be an immediate concern in the formulation of a
meaningful antitrust policy. 62
162. inhere is a sense abroad that the law is at the brink, that new links may soon
be marked out by decision or legislation. This sense of expectation is nurtured by
increasing judicial use of structural analysis and increasing readiness by courts to
attend to the possible implications of performance data.
Id at 355; "[Tihe gulf between economics and price fixing is gradually narrowing.. ." IL
POSNEP, supra note 3, at 41.
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